SEC Proposes New Share Repurchase Disclosure Rules
On December 15, 2021, the SEC proposed amendments to Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-18, which provides issuers and affiliates with a non-exclusive safe harbor from liability for market manipulation under Sections 9(a)(2) and 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (“Exchange Act”) when issuers bid for or repurchase their common stock. The proposed new rules are part of a broader SEC initiative aimed at market manipulation and insider trading, including proposed new amendments related to Rule 10b5-1 Insider Trading Plans (see HERE). The proposed amendments are intended to improve the quality, relevance, and timeliness of information related to issuer share repurchases.
The proposed rules would require an issuer to provide a new Form SR before the end of the first business day following the day the issuer executes a share repurchase. Form SR would require disclosure identifying the class of securities purchased, the total amount purchased, the average price paid, as well
SEC Proposes Amendments To Rule 10b5-1 Insider Trading Plans
As expected from the Spring 2021 Regulatory Agenda, on December 15, 2021, the SEC proposed amendments to Rule 10b5-1 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) to enhance disclosure requirements and investor protections against insider trading. Although there is a statutory framework, the laws surrounding insider trading are largely based on judicial precedence and are difficult to navigate. I last wrote about insider trading in 2014 (see HERE) but there have been many curves in the road since that time.
Since the adoption of Rule 10b5-1, courts, commentators, and members of Congress have expressed concern that the affirmative defense under Rule 10b5-1(c)(1)(i) has allowed traders to take advantage of the liability protections provided by the rule to opportunistically trade securities on the basis of material nonpublic information. Furthermore, some academic studies of Rule 10b5-1 trading arrangements have shown that corporate insiders trading pursuant to Rule 10b5-1 consistently outperform trading of executives and directors not conducted under a
