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Delaware Corporations

Class Voting In Delaware And The Impact On SPACs

In December 2022, the Delaware Chancery Court entered a ruling sending the SPAC world spiraling, for what seems like the 10th time in the last couple of years.  As is always the case in a SPAC (or at least 99% of the time), common stock is broken into two series, Class A and Class B.  The Class A common stock is issued to the public shareholders in the underwritten initial public offering and the Class B common stock is issued to the sponsor.  Upon closing a business combination transaction, the sponsor Class B common stock automatically converts into Class A common stock, leaving one Class of common stock.  Also, in the majority of SPAC transactions, the shareholder approval for the business combination transaction involves other changes to the charter documents for the SPAC, including a name change, and changes in authorized capital stock, etc.  The term “charter” in this blog refers to the certificate of incorporation and any amendments

2022 Delaware Corporate Law (DGCL) Amendments

Each year the Delaware legislature passes several amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) which impact public and private companies incorporated in Delaware, and elsewhere, as many states follow the DGCL. Effective August 1, 2022, the DGCL has been amended to: (i) add certain exculpation provisions in favor of senior officers; (ii) reduce the voting rights necessary to convert a corporation to another type of business entity; (iii) require a dissolution filing upon expiration of a corporate existence; (iv) update signature affirmations; (v) eliminate the requirement to make a stockholder list available during a stockholder meeting; (vi) clarify the method of notice for a stockholder meeting; (vii) increase insurance protections; (viii) update three important provisions related to stockholder appraisal rights; (ix) provide technical updates to the requirements for equity issuances; (x) broaden the ability to complete advance stockholder consents; (xi) improve the method of effectuating a domestication; and (xii) clarify annual franchise tax reports.

Stockholder Appraisal Rights

Appraisal

Caremark Eroded – Director Liability In Delaware

This year has marked a string of cases eroding the long history of Delaware’s board of director protections from breach of fiduciary duty claims.  In Re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation was a civil action in the Delaware Court of Chancery in 1996 which drilled down on a director’s duty of care in the oversight context.  Caremark found that generally directors do not need to approve or exercise oversight over most company decisions, other than mergers (see HERE), changes in capital structure and fundamental changes in business.

Caremark claims, which allege failures of board oversight, have long been regarded by Delaware courts as “possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.” To plead and prove a Caremark claim, a stockholder plaintiff must show that the board either (i) “utterly failed to implement any reporting information restrictions or controls”; or (ii) having implemented them, “consciously failed to monitor or oversee

Mergers And Acquisitions; Board Of Directors Responsibilities – Delaware

Recently the Delaware Chancery Court rejected an interested executive’s defense of a breach of fiduciary duty claim, reminding us of the importance of making full and accurate disclosures when seeking shareholder approval for a merger or acquisition transaction. In particular, in the case of In re Xura, Inc. Stockholder Litigation the Delaware Chancery Court denied a motion to dismiss brought against a merger target company’s CEO, alleging that he had orchestrated the company’s sale to a particular bidder based on his self-interest in the outcome of the transaction.

The CEO argued that his actions should have been judged by the deferential business judgement rule and not a higher entire fairness standard because the transaction was approved by a majority of the disinterested shareholders. The CEO relied on the 2015 Delaware Supreme Court case of Corwin v. KKR Financing Holdings which held that a transaction that would be subject to enhanced scrutiny would instead be reviewed under the deferential business judgment

Recent Notable Changes To Delaware Corporate Law

This summer the Delaware legislature passed several amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) which impact public and private companies incorporated in Delaware, and elsewhere, as many states follow the DGCL.

Mergers Using DGCL Section 251(h)

Section 251(h) was first enacted in 2013. Section 251(h) eliminates the need for shareholder approval to complete a merger, where such merger is completed following a tender or exchange offer and the acquirer owns at least the percentage amount of the target that is needed to approve the merger. That is, Section 251(h) eliminates unnecessary time and expense related to a vote on a merger when certain preconditions have been satisfied. These preconditions include:

  1. The merger must be consummated as soon as practicable following the tender offer or exchange offer;
  2. The underlying tender or exchange offer must be for all of the outstanding stock of the target, except for the stock owned by the acquirer or any person that directly or
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A Comparison Of Nevada, Delaware And Florida Corporate Statutes

When forming a new entity, I am often asked the best state of domicile.  Following a July 1, 2014 increase in Delaware franchise taxes, I am also often asked the best state to re-domicile or move to following an exit from Delaware.   Delaware remains the gold standard; however, there has been a definite shift and Delaware is now not the “only standard.”

Part of the reason for the shift away from Delaware has been the increase in fees.  Delaware calculates annual fees based on one of two methods: (i) the authorized share method; and (ii) the assume par value capital (asset value) method.  For either method the annual fee is capped at $180,000.00.   Even for small- and micro-cap business issuers, the annual fee often reaches the tens of thousands.  For example, a company with 300,000,000 common shares authorized with a $.001 par value per share and 30,000,000 shares issued and outstanding and $20,000,000 in gross assets would pay $180,000.00 per

Mergers And Acquisitions; Appraisal Rights

Unless they are a party to the transaction itself, such as in the case of a share-for-share exchange agreement, shareholders of a company in a merger transaction generally have what is referred to as “dissenters” or “appraisal rights.”  An appraisal right is the statutory right by shareholders that dissent to a particular transaction, to receive the fair value of their stock ownership.  Generally such fair value may be determined in a judicial or court proceeding or by an independent valuation.  Appraisal rights and valuations are the subject of extensive litigation in merger and acquisition transactions.  As with all corporate law matters, the Delaware legislature and courts lead the way in setting standards and precedence.

Delaware Statutory Appraisal Rights

Although the details and appraisal rights process vary from state to state (often meaningfully), as with other state corporate law matters, Delaware is the leading statutory example and the Delaware Chancery Court is the leader in judicial precedence in this area of

Delaware General Corporate Law Amended to Prohibit Fee-Shifting Clauses; Permit Forum Selection Provisions

Although the federal government and FINRA have become increasingly active in matters of corporate governance, the states still remain the primary authority and regulator of corporate law.  State corporation law is generally based on the Delaware Model Act and offers corporations a degree of flexibility from a menu of reasonable alternatives that can be tailored to companies’ business sectors, markets and corporate culture.  Moreover, state judiciaries review and rule upon corporate governance matters, considering the facts and circumstances of each case and setting factual precedence based on such individual circumstances. 

On June 24, 2015, Delaware amended the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”) to prohibit fee shifting provisions.  The DGCL amendments also allow Delaware corporations to adopt exclusive (and non-exclusive) forum selection provisions in their corporate charters.  The amendments went into effect August 1, 2015.

Fee Shifting Provisions

As a result of increasing shareholder activism and filed or threatened shareholder lawsuits, corporations have started adding provisions in their corporate charters (articles

Delaware General Corporate Law; 2014 Amendments Summarized

ABA Journal’s 10th Annual Blawg 100

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Although the federal government and FINRA have become increasingly active in matters of corporate governance, the states still remain the primary authority and regulator of corporate law.  State corporation law is generally based on the Delaware Model Act and offers corporations a degree of flexibility from a menu of reasonable alternatives that can be tailored to companies’ business sectors, markets and corporate culture.  Moreover, state judiciaries review and rule upon corporate governance matters, considering the facts and circumstances of each case and setting factual precedence based on such individual circumstances.  In 2014 there were several changes to the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) which impact public and private companies incorporated in Delaware, and elsewhere, since most states follow the DGCL.

The 2014 amendments which became effective on August 1, 2014, address: (1) mergers under DGCL Section 251(h) permitting a merger without a stockholder vote following certain tender or exchange offers; (2) director and

Contracting Away Fiduciary Obligations In Delaware LLCs And Limited Partnerships

Delaware corporate and alternative entity law has long been the model for other states in drafting statutes and for practitioners in advising clients and preparing limited partnership agreements and limited liability company membership agreements.

In 2005 the Delaware legislature amended its Limited Liability Company Act and Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act to provide drafters of LP and LLC agreements with broad flexibility to modify default fiduciary duties. Both Acts now provide that default fiduciary obligations mat be restricted or eliminated, provided that the implied covenant of fair dealing and good faith may not be eliminated. Many states have followed suit.

Delaware Corporate Law

Under Delaware law, the purpose of the implied covenant of fair dealing and good faith is to enforce the reasonable expectations of parties to a contract where situations arise that are not expressly contemplated and provided for in the language of the contract itself. Although the covenant of good faith and fair dealing itself cannot be waived,

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